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In 2017, after the election of Donald Trump and his subsequent lan-
guage and actions surrounding global trade, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
took the world stage at the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting in a 
moment that led many to say he assumed the mantle of world leader on glo-
balism and global trade, particularly in Asia. Previously, President Obama 
noted that the TPP presented an opportunity for the Us., along with its 
partners, to write the rules of international trade with Asia-Pacific coun-
tries. At the same time, China has been working to negotiate another trade 
agreement in the Asia-Pacific Region, the Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP aims to be the largest free-trade 
bloc in the world, comprising all ten ASEAN nations (Brunei, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thai-
land, Vietnam) and the six other countries with which A SEAN already has 
free-trade agreements (FTAs) - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Austra-
lia, and New Zealand. 
With China ascending in global leadership on Asian trade at the same 
time the Us. descends, a looming question arises-what is to be expected 
in terms of trade rules and labor protections? There is a history on both 
issues that is explored in this paper and which reveals there may be dif-
ficulties ahead for those looking for an even playing field in trade and 
attention to labor protections. To many, it will seem like RCEP is a green 
light for MNCs to further invest in their labor supply chains in the devel-
oping countries in Asia, much to the consternation of labor unions in the 
Us. and the detriment to American and Asian workers. Further, there are 
outstanding questions as to the efficacy of any labor protections that arise 
in future agreements. The Asia-Pacific Region is one of the largest mar-
kets in the world, so answering these questions is critical. To arrive at a fair 
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estimate of what to expect in terms of real labor law protections and their 
enforcement in Asian countries under the Chinese-influenced FTAs, this 
paper examines the social dimension provisions of the Chinese free trade 
agreements (FTAs) in Asia relating to labor. 
The paper is structured as follows: Part I introduces the new reality 
and implications of China's rising global leadership in free trade agree-
ments in Asia; Part II deals with the landscape of current Chinese FTAs in 
Asia, including the very few with any labor provisions; Part III analyzes 
the Chinese and Us. approaches, discusses expectations, and explores alter-
natives for those interested in expanding labor protections in the Asian 
Region; Part IV concludes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A. New Global Leadership in China's Free Trade Agreements in Asia 
"If anyone were to say China is playing a leadership role in the world 
I would say it's not China rushing to the front but rather the front 
runners have stepped back leaving the place to China."l 
1. Ben Blanchard, As Trump Stresses 'America First; China Plays the World 
Leader, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2017, 11:27 PM), https:llwww.reuters.com/artic1e/us-usa-
trump-china-analysis/as-trump-stresses-america-first-china-plays-the-world-leader-
idUSKBN1590KJ [https:llperma.cc/TX55-42KF] (quoting Zhang Jun, director gener-
al of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's international economics department). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the most prestigious inter-
national financial institution in the world, has rated China's ranking to 
number one economic superpower in the world-surpassing those [sic] 
of the United States based upon the purchasing power parity of GDP in-
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Following the election of Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jin-
ping took the world stage at the 2017 World Economic Forum's Annual 
Meeting. In doing so, many said he assumed the mantle of world leader 
for globalism and global trade, particularly in Asia.2 President Trump had 
previously abdicated this role,3 pulling the U.S. back from its commit-
ment to the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and announcing: "We will no 
longer surrender this country, or its people, to the false song of global-
ism."4 He also pulled out of commitments to the Paris Climate Accord 
dicator (gross domestic product). IMF has asserted that China produced 
17% of the world gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 exceeding U. 
SA's [sic] GDP of world's [sic] 16%. 
Nake M. Kamrany & Frank Jiang, China's Rise to Global Economic Superpower, 
HUFFPOST: THE WORLD POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nake-m-kamrany/ 
chinas-rise-to-global-eco_b_6544924.html [https:llperma.cc/29LF-XF35]. 
2. President Xi announced: 
[I]t is true that economic globalization has created new problems, 
but this is no justification to write economic globalization off completely. 
Rather, we should adapt to and guide economic globalization, cushion its 
negative impact, and deliver its benefits to all countries and all nations . 
. . . China also had doubts about economic globalization, and was not 
sure whether it should join the World Trade Organization. But we came 
to the conclusion that integration into the global economy is a historical 
trend. To grow its economy, China must have the courage to swim in the 
vast ocean of the global market .... 
Whether you like it or not, the global economy is the big ocean that 
you cannot escape from. Any attempt to cut off the flow of capital, tech-
nologies, products, industries and people between economies, and chan-
nel the waters in the ocean back into isolated lakes and creeks is simply 
not possible. Indeed, it runs counter to the historical trend. 
President Xi's Speech to Davos in Full, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https:llwww.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi -jinping-keynote-at- the-
world-economic-forum [https:llperma.ccNSY2-BZUV];see Enda Curran, Xi, Unlike-
ly Champion for Business Elites, Takes Davos Spotlight, BLOOMBERG: POLITICS (Jan. 
16, 2017, 1:03 AM), https:llwww.bloomberg.comlnews/articles/2017-01-16/xi-unlikely-
champion-for-business-elites-takes-davos-spotlight [https:llperma.cc/XUV2-ZNUD]. 
3. Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Nego-
tiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 5, 2016), https:llwww.federalregister. 
gov Idocuments/20 17 101!25/2017-01845/withdrawal-of-the-united -states-from- the-
trans--pacific-partnership-negotiations-and-agreement. 
4. Ishaan Tharoor, After Clinton, Trump's Real Enemy Is 'Globalism', WASH. 
POST: WORLD VIEWS (Nov. 3, 2016), https:llwww.washingtonpost.comlnews/world-
views/wp/2016/10/28/how-globalism-became-the-boogeyman-of-2016/?utm_term=. 
feee82ad6566 [https:llperma.cc/2VB3-MLCL]. President Trump in his public state-
ments has claimed that" [t]he TPP is [a] horrible deal .... It's a deal that was designed 
for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door and totally take ad-
vantage of everyone." Clayton Youngman, Trump Says China Gets an Advantage from 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, POLITIFACT (Nov. 12, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://www.politi-
fact.comltruth-o-meterlstatements/2015/nov/12/donald-trumpItrump-says-china-will-
take-advantage-trans-pacificl [https:llperma.cc/9YAE-6EN9]. However, Youngman 
explains that: 
We asked experts if there was any way China could possibly take advan-
tage of the TPP. The experts all agreed: The trade deal will most likely 
negatively impact China. 
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and has threatened the same with the Korea-US. Free Trade Agreement 
(KORUS) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).5 
Before Trump's withdrawal, President Obama noted that the 
TPP presented an opportunity for the US. and its partners to write the 
rules of international trade with Asia-Pacific countries.6 The TPP was an 
attempt by the US. to participate in the growing expansion of FTAs in 
the Asia-Pacific Region.7 It has been reported that in May 2017, Japa-
nese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently declared that while he hoped 
for America's return to the TPP, Japan was willing to take the lead in 
bringing the deal to fruition. New Zealand has joined Japan in announc-
ing they will seek an agreement with other signatories by November 
2017 to move the TPP forward.8 On November 11,2017, at a side meet-
ing during an APEC meeting in Vietnam, members of the TPP agreed to 
Joel P. Trachtman, an international law professor at the Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy, said the deal "would mean there would be zero 
tariffs on goods coming to the United States from places that compete 
with China." 
Id. The dichotomy between the approaches of the two leaders was confirmed at 
an APEC meeting in Vietnam on November 11,2017. 
At a speech in Danang, Trump set out a strong message making clear he 
was only interested in bilateral deals in Asia that would never put the 
United States at a disadvantage. 
China's President Xi Jinping, meanwhile, used the same forum to stress multilat-
eralism and said globalization was an irreversible trend. 
Kiyoshi Takenaka & Matthew Tostevin, TP P Countries Salvage Agreement to 
Keep Trade Deal Alive, CNBC (Nov. 10, 2017, 2:08 PM), https:llwww.cnbc. 
com/2017 111/10lreuters-america -tpp-countries-salvage-agreement-to-keep-trade-
deal-alive.html?view=story [https:llperma.cc/3BUP-KR22l. 
5. Philip Rucker, Trump: 'We May Terminate' US.-South Korea Trade Agree-
ment, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), https:llwww.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
we-may-terminate-us-south -korea -trade-agreement/20 17/04/27175 ad1218-2bad-
11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html?utm_term=.506185b54e92 [https:llperma.cc/ 
G6S6-H2UAl; Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw Us. From Paris Climate 
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https:llwww.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/ 
trump-paris-climate-agreement.html [https:llperma.cc177S7-6CLSl. 
6. Jeff Okun-Kozlowicki & Gabe Horwitz, The TPP: Who Will Set the Trade 
Rules for Asia?, THIRD WAY (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.thirdway.orglreport/the-tpp-
who-will-set-the-trade-rules-for-asia [https:llperma.cc/AFJ6-CPEVl. The TPP coun-
tries are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Sin-
gapore, the United States, and Vietnam. See Ronald C. Brown, FTAs In Asia-Pacific: 
"Next Generation" of Social Dimension Provisions on Labor? 26 IND. INT'L & COMPo L. 
REV. 69 (2016). 
7. See Brown, supra note 6, at 79. Now, even after the U.S. exit, Japan hopes 
to go forward with the TPP. Japan's Finance Minister made the announcement on 
April 25, 2017. Robbie Gramer, Japan Wants to Revive the Trans Pacific Partnership 
Even Without the Us., FOREIGN POL'y (Apr. 24, 2017, 3:16 PM), http://foreignpolicy. 
com/2017/04/24/j apan -wants-to- revive-trans-pacific-partnershi p-even -without -unit-
ed-states-asia-trade-agreementsl [https:llperma.cc/ZX79-23MJl. 
8. Koichi Hamada, The Rebirth of the TPP, PROJECT SYNDICATE (June 29, 2017), 
https:llwww.project-syndicate.orglcommentary/tpp-revival-j apan -us-by-koichi -ham a -
da-2017-06 [https:llperma.cc/XWL9-ZCM3j. Mr. Hamada is Professor Emeritus at 
Yale University and a special adviser to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Id. 
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continue working on the proposed trade deal. According to a draft due 
to be released on Saturday, November 11,2017 in Vietnam, "the 11 coun-
tries committed to 'the core elements' of a deal while making clear more 
work remains."9 
At the same time, China has been involved in negotiations on 
another trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific Region, the Regional Com-
prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).lO The RCEP aims to be the 
largest free-trade bloc in the world, comprising all ten Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and 
the six countries with which ASEAN already has FTAs (China, India, 
Japan, South Korea,Australia, and New Zealand)Y 
While China, as the largest player in the region, is taking the initia-
tive and ascending to global leadership of Asian trade, the U.S. has begun 
descending from prominent involvement. This phenomenon presents a 
looming question: what is to be expected in terms of trade rules and labor 
protections? 
This paper explores the history of trade rules and labor protections, 
and it ultimately reveals that the future presents an uneven playing field 
regarding trade and labor protections. Without labor obligations in its 
FTAs, the RCEP seems to encourage multinational corporations (MNCs) 
to further invest in labor supply chains in developing Asian countries. 
This will likely worry labor unions in the U.S. and disadvantage Ameri-
can and Asian workers.12 
9. Takenaka & Tostevin, supra note 4. The 11 TPP partners, without the US., 
have agreed to core elements of the TPP and are scheduled for final signing in March 
201S. Louise Yaxley, TPP Resurrected: Here's What's in the Latest Trans-Pacific Part-
nership Trade Deal and What It Meams for You, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Jan. 24, 201S, 
10:33 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/201S-01-24/what-is-the-new-tpp-and-what-
does-it-mean-for-australia/9357020 [https:llperma.cc/Z5QS-9KUL). 
10. See Brown, supra note 6, at 79. 
11. Murray Hiebert, ASEAN and Partners Launch Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC INT'L STUD. (Dec. 7, 2012), https:llwww.csis. 
org/analysis/asean-and-partners-launch-regional-comprehensive-economic-partner-
ship [https:llperma.cc/PZ4Y-436U). 
Southeast Asian countries will prioritize creating an Asia-focused trade 
pact this year that includes China, India and Japan, while trade issues 
with the United States will be put on the back burner, the Philippine 
trade minister said. 
The US. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and policy uncer-
tainties cast by President Donald Trump's protectionist leanings, have spurred Asian 
countries to push ahead with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), Trade and Industry Secretary Ramon Lopez told Reuters late on Tuesday. 
Martin Petty & Karen Lema, Interview: Southeast Asia Prioritizes Trade Pact In-
cluding China as Us. Rethinks Policy, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2017, 1:42 AM), http://in.mo-
bile.reuters.comlarticie/ousivMolt/idINKBN17S0T2 [https:llperma.cc17BJS-P4WS). 
12. US. labor unions often point to the negative impacts of FTAs on American 
workers and their jobs. Jeff Faux, NAFTA's Impact on us. Workers, EcoN. POLY INST.: 
WORKING EcoN. BLOG (Dec. 9, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/naftas-im-
pact-workers [https:llperma.cc/NT9P-VASA); see also Mi Park, Trade Liberalization 
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B. Implications and Roadmap 
The replacement of US. presence by Chinese leadership will impli-
cate three aspects of global trade practices: the authorship of trade rules, 
the absence of labor protections, and the contrasts in expected trade prac-
tices evidenced by past practices. A primary difference between the TPP 
and RCEP is that US. trade agreements always contain labor protections 
based on ILO core labor standards, whereas Chinese trade agreements 
do not.13 US. withdrawal opens the door to RCEP trade rules, which will 
impact US. and Asian workers by omitting protections of International 
Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards and enforcement obli-
gations of the governing state parties. While it is true that FTAs are a 
disputed means of raising labor standards, they are effective in provid-
ing global labor standards that compliant nations must strive to adhere 
to. However, a complication could arise when existing members of the 
RCEP already have labor protection obligations with the US. or other 
countries that are independent of their membership in RCEP. 
The Asia-Pacific Region is a large market with a combined GDP 
of almost $21 trillion (about 30 percent of world GDP) and $4.4 trillion 
in exports of goods and services (about a fifth of total world exports).14 
In 2017, it was reported that prospective RCEP member states had a 
population of about 3.4 billion people with a total GDP of $49.5 trillion 
(approximately 39 percent of the world's GDP).15 
and Organized Labour in the Asia-Pacific Region: Barriers to Labour International-
ism, 11 GLOBALIZATIONS 71,76-77 (2014) http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/1O.108 
0/14747731.2014.860799 [https:llperma.cc/T4BE-JBL9]; Labor Unions Remain Stead-
fastly Opposed To Trans-Pacific Trade Measure (NPR radio broadcast June 16,2015), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/06/16/414831901/labor-unions-remain-steadfastly-opposed-
to-trans-pacific-trade-measure [https:llperma.cc/K3H5-MDDZ]; Ronald C. Brown, 
FTAs in Asia-Pacific: 'Next Generation' of Social Dimension Provisions on Labor?, 
26 IND. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 69 (2016) [hereinafter Brown, FTAs in Asia-Pacific]; 
Ronald C. Brown, Mega-Regionalism: TPP Labor Provisions: A Game Changer? 10-
12 (May 10, 2016), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/filemanager/pubsl 
pdfs!7-5Brown.pdf [https:llperma.cc/AEA3-KVMN] [hereinafter Brown, Mega-Re-
gionalism] (presented at the NSF Workshop on Mega-Regionalism: New Challeng-
es for Trade and Innovation (MCTI) at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, on 
January 20-21, 2016). 
13. See Brown, Mega-Regionalism, supra note 12 at 6; Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, https:llustr. 
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text 
[https:llperma.cc/8467-7NPQ]; see also Ronald C. Brown, Asian and US Perspectives 
on Labor Rights under International Trade Agreements Compared, in PROTECTING LA-
BOR RIGHTS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 83 (Axel Marx et aI., eds., 2015) [hereinafter 
Brown,Asian and US Perspectives]. China does have labor cooperation provisions in a 
few of its FTAs or side MOUs, but they appear unenforceable, as discussed in section 
II B of this paper. 
14. Barbara Kotschwar & Jeffrey 1. Schott, The Next Big Thing? The Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership & Latin America, AM. Q., Spring 2013, http://www.americasquarterly. 
org/next -big-thing -trans-pacific-partnership [https:llperma.cc/PT22-BZ8X]. 
15. Stefani Ribka & Linda Yulisman, RCEP Talks Speed Up Amid TP P Failure, 
JAKARTA POST (Dec. 7, 2016, 7:36 AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/07/ 
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Since 2000, China has entered into thirteen trade agreements. Eight 
have no labor provisions, while five have watered-down provisions with 
general goals, such as cooperative workshops and general labor coop-
eration. Several of the agreements have these provisions only in an 
accompanying Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Further, most 
of these watered-down provisions are arguably not written to be enforce-
able except through mutual consultation and agreement.!6 It has been 
argued that China's trade practices are characterized by three elements: 
exclusion, favoritism, and lower standards for labor and corruption. This 
leads some to conclude that "if China sets the rules for Asia, govern-
ments across the region could reverse years of progress toward openness 
and transparency."!7 
This paper examines the social dimension provisions of Chinese 
FTAs relating to labor, some of the ILO's core labor protections. Its 
purpose is to estimate how Chinese-influenced FTAs may affect imple-
mentation of real labor law protections in Asian countries. This analysis is 
divided into four component parts: Part I introduces the new reality and 
implications of China's rising global leadership in FTAs in Asia; Part II 
deals with the landscape of current Chinese FTAs in Asia, including those 
with labor provisions; Part III analyzes Chinese and U.S. approaches, dis-
cusses expectations, and explores alternatives for those interested in 
expanding labor protections in the Asian Region; and finally, Part IV 
shares the conclusions of this analysis. 
II. LANDSCAPE OF FTAS AND TRADE PRACTICES IN ASIA AND CHINA 
A. FTAs in Asia 
While trade liberalization and economic integration in the Asia-Pa-
cific region have proliferated,!8 a recent ADB-sponsored study reports 
rcep-talks-speed-up-amid-tpp-failure.html [https:llperma.cc/E82Y-MUHTl. 
16. Jay Chittooran, What Do Chinese Rules Mean for Worker Rights?, THIRD 
WAY (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.thirdway.org/report/what-do-chinese-rules-mean-for-
worker-rights [https:llperma.cc/EJD3-32RAl. 
17. Okun-Kozlowicki & Horwitz, supra note 6. 
18. See ASIAN DEV. BANK, REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION IN A CHANG-
ING WORLD 17-26 (2013), httPS:llwww.adb.org/sites/default/files/Publication/30224/re-
giOnal_cooperation_Changing_world.Pdf[httPs:IIPerma.cc/E9VV_2EDWl [hereinafter 
REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION l; Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignara-
ja, Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects, and Challenges 5 (Asian Dev. Bank, ADB Econ. 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 226, 2010), https:llwww.adb.org/sites/default/files/ 
publicationl28273/economics-wp226.pdf [https:llperma.ccIW8RN-PKUPl. Masahiro 
Kawai is Dean of the Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo and Ganeshan Wig-
naraja is Principal Economist in the Office of Regional Economic Cooperation, Asian 
Development Bank. Asian FTAs are under scrutiny for their scope, such as their in-
clusion of new issues that go beyond the World Trade Organization framework. Id. at 
17. "Two leading participants in Asian FTAs-Japan and Singapore-strongly favor 
a WTO-plus approach to FTAs. All of Japan's agreements and most of Singapore's 
are WTO-plus. Likewise, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam largely follow a WTO-plus format." Id. at 19. 
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that the use of FTAs, a newer phenomenon to the region, has been dis-
torted, with excessive exclusions and deferential treatment to certain 
countries and partners.19 The ILO states that trade agreements incorpo-
rating labor protection provisions have steadily increased (from four in 
1995 to 21 in 2005, and then to 70 in 2013).20 Of the roughly 190 countries 
with trade agreements, about 120 are partners to trade agreements that 
include labor provisions.21 
A recent article categorized Asian bilateral and mega-regional 
FTAs into three types: Asian (documenting the great proliferation by 
Asian states), US-Asian (that include social dimension provisions with 
labor standard protections), and Inter-Asian (that generally did not 
include social dimension provisions with labor standard protections).22 
When the U.S. or other developed, western nations, such as those in the 
EU, are parties to the FTA, there was typically a social dimension pro-
vision with labor standard protections, whereas by contrast, Inter-Asian 
FTAs did not include these provisions. Leading the way in FTA volume 
are the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and their trade partners: Australia, the People's Republic of 
China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. Together, 
these FTAs have increased from 27 in 2002 to 179 by January 2013, a 600 
percent increase.23 
Singapore's primary issues were found to be newer additions to the scope of an FTA 
agreement, and included investment, competition, intellectual property, and public 
procurement ("the four Singapore issues"). Id. at 2. These go beyond the scope of the 
WTO requirements and thus are sometimes incorporated to FTAs and characterized 
as "WTO-plus." These newer issues were economically focused, without inclusion of a 
social dimension provision. Id. at 17. 
19. Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 18, at 5. 
20. lORD! AGUSTf-PANAREDA ET AL., INT'L LABOUR ORG., LABOUR PROVISIONS IN FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS: FOSTERING THEIR CONSISTENCY WITH THE ILO STANDARDS SYSTEM 7--8 
(2014), http://www.ilo.org/inst/projects/labour-standards-in-trade-and-investment-ar-
rangements/WCMS_237940Ilang--eniindex.htm [https:llperma.cc/HYJ7-BCHNj. 
21. FRANZ EBERT, INT'L LABOUR ORG., SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 5 (2015), http://WWW.ilo.org/WCmSP5/groUPS/PUbIiC/---dgreports/---inst/ 
documents/PublicatiOnlwcmS_228965.Pdf[httPs://Perma.cc/4S2A_F5NPj.ThiS publi-
cation states the number of FTAs with labor provisions in 2013 was 58, an increase 
from 21 in 2005. Id. 
22. Brown, Asian and US Perspectives, supra note 13, at 96-112. 
23. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION, supra note 18, at 18; see also 
Brown, Asian and US Perspectives, supra note 13, at 96-112. 
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Mega-regional trade deals have recently become more popular.24 
The RCEP is one example of such a deaI.25 ASEAN is leading negotia-
tions with its six partners to establish the RCEp'26 
Asia's own mega-regional trade deal-the Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership (RCEP)-was launched in 2012 and could 
create the world's largest trading bloc and have significant implications 
for the world economy. The objective is to "achieve a modern, com-
prehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial conomic partnership 
agreement among the ASEAN Member States and ASEAN's FTA Part-
ners." At the same time, a "key purpose is to reconcile two long-standing 
proposals into a large region-wide trade agreement: The East Asian Free 
Trade Agreement, which included ASEAN, China, Japan and South 
Korea, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which 
added Australia, India and New Zealand. The RCEP bridges the two pro-
posals by adopting an open accession scheme."27 
24. Brown, Mega-Regionalism, supra note 12, at 2-3. 
Because the RCEP will contain three of the largest economies in the 
world-China, India and Japan-it is globally important. The bloc rep-
resents 49 per cent of the world's population and accounts for 30 per cent 
of world GDP. It also makes up 29 per cent of world trade and 26 per cent 
of world FDI inflows. Conservative estimates using various computable 
general equilibrium models suggest that if the RCEP were implement-
ed it would bring large income gains to the world economy of between 
US$260-644 billion in a decade or so. 
Ganeshan Wignaraja, Why the RCEP Matters for Asia and the World, E. ASIA 
FORUM (May lS, 2013), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/0S/1S/why-the-rcep-mat-
ters-for-asia-and-the-worldl [https:llperma.cc/SFGJ-3DN3); see also REGIONAL Co-
OPERATION AND INTEGRATION, supra note lS, at lS. Other regional developments are 
also moving forward. In March 2014, China, Japan, and South Korea held their fourth 
round of negotiations over a trilateral free trade agreement (China-Japan-South Ko-
rea FTA). Id. A critique on the trajectory of the RCEP and its relationship with re-
gional FTAs in East Asia is found in a recent ADB report. See generally Yoshifumi 
Fukunaga & Ikumo Isono, Taking ASEAN+l FTAs Towards the RCEP: A Mapping 
Study (Econ. Research Inst. For ASEAN & E. Asia, Discussion Paper No. 2013-02, 
2013), http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2013-02.pdf[https://perma.cc/PB6C-96HS). 
2S. Wignaraja, supra note 24. 
26. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) , ASS'N OF SE. 
ASIAN NATIONS (Oct. 3, 2016), http://asean.org/?static_post=rcep-regional-compre-
hensive-economic-partnership [https:llperma.cc/4CAV-SATH); JAMES WALLAR, NAT'L 
BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, ACHIEVING THE PROMISE OF THE ASEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY: LESS THAN You IMAGINE, MORE THAN You KNOW 20 (July 2014), http:// 
www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/ETA/waliacpaper_072S14.pdf[https:llperma.ccIFTT6-
9MSB). Originally it was to be completed by 201S, the deadline ASEAN set to achieve 
the ASEAN Economic Community, which envisages a highly competitive single mar-
ket and production base that is fully integrated into the global economy. ASIAN DEV. 
BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK (ADO) 2013: ASIA'S ENERGY CHALLENGE 13 
(2013), https:llwww.adb.org/publications/asian-development-outlook-2013-asias-en-
ergy-challenge [https:llperma.cc/NVN2-VKPS); Guiding Principles and Objectives for 
Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, AUSTL. DEPT. OF FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE (2012), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/Documents/ 
guiding-principles-rcep.pdf [https:llperma.cc/TLPS-BZST) 
27. Brown, Asian and US Perspectives, supra note 13, at 99 (citations omitted). 
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Chart 1, below, draws attention to the 16 RCEP members' dramat-
ically wide variances in relative economic development and their likely 
level of sophistication in current domestic labor law protections. Since 
the RCEP FTA does not include international labor standard obligations, 
the agreement could potentially encourage MNCs in more developed 
member countries with higher labor standards to go offshore and utilize 
their global labor chains in lesser-developed RCEP member countries to 
take advantage of these lower standards. 
Chart 1: Members of RCEP, ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and TPP 
RCEP CPTPP March 8,2018 Higher Risk re 
Labor Protections 
ASEAN members: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Ma· 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, laysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Phil· New Zealand, Peru, Singa· Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, 
ippines, Singapore, Thailand, and pore, and Vietnam Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, 
Vietnam; and Indonesia, Malay· Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, 
sia, Philippines, Singapore, China, South Korea, and India. 
Thailand, Brunei, Laos, Myan· 
mar, Cambodia, China, Japan, 
South Korea, India, Australia, 
and New Zealand. 
Another source of labor protections can be found in ILO core labor 
conventions. These protections have been ratified by the member states 
below and have empowered the ILO to assist and monitor labor condi-
tions, even with an absence of FTA parallel ILO protections and their 
additional enforcement mechanisms. RCEP members also have wide 
variances in the numbers of ILO core labor conventions they have rati-
fied; see Chart 2 below. 
Chart 2: ILO Core Labor Conventions Ratified 
RCEP States Freedom of Elimination Elimination of Abolition 
Association and of Forced and Discrimination In of Child Labor 
Collective Compulsory Labor Respect of Employ. 
Bargaining ment and Occnpation 
No. 87 No. 98 No. 29 No. 105 No. 100 No. 111 No. 138 No. 182 
Brunei 6/17/11 6/9/08 
Cambodia 8/23/99 8/23/99 2/24/69 8/23/99 8/23/99 8/23/99 8/23/99 3/14/06 
Indonesia 6/9/98 7/15/57 6/12/50 6/7/99 8/ll/58 6/7/99 6/7/99 3/28/00 
Laos 1/23/64 6/13/08 6/13/08 6/13/05 6/13/05 
See Brown, Mega-Regionalism, supra note 12, at 3. Negotiations among the 16 par-
ties began in early 2013 but are not yet concluded. The 19th Round of Negotiations 
for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was held in India, from 
July 18--28, 2017. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 19th Round of 
Negotiations for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (July 
14, 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001666.html [https://perma. 
cc/2QVN-U653]. RCEP includes the following countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Phil-
ippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, China, Japan, 
South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. 
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RCEP States Freedom of Elimination Elimination of Abolition 
Association and of Forced and Discrimination In of Child Labor 
Collective Compulsory Labor Respect of Employ. 
Bargainiog ment and Occnpation 
Malaysia 6/5/61 11/11/57 10/13/58* 9/9/97 9/9/97 11/10/00 
Myanmar 3/4/55 3/4/55 12/18/14 
Philippines 12/29/53 12/29/53 7/15/05 11117/60 12/29/53 11117/60 6/4/98 11/28/00 
Singapore 10/25/65 10/25/65 10/25/65* 5/30/02 11/7/05 6/14/01 
Thailand 2/26/69 12/2/69 2/8/99 6/13117 5111/04 6/16/01 
Vietnam 3/5/07 10/7/97 10/7/97 6/24/03 12/19/00 
Australia 2/28/73 2/28/73 1/2/32 6/7/60 12/10174 6/15/73 12/19/06 
China 1112/90 1/12/06 4/28/99 8/8/02 
India 11/30/54 5/18/00 9/25/58 6/3/60 6/13/17 6/13/17 
Japan 6/14/65 10/20/53 11/21/32 8/24/67 6/5/00 6/18/01 
South Korea 12/8/97 12/4/98 1/28/99 3/29/01 
New 6/9/03 3/29/38 6/14/68 6/3/83 6/3/83 6/14/01 
Zealand 
As confirmed in Chart 3 of the Appendices at the end of the text, 
inter-Asian FTAs with social dimension (SD) provisions on labor pro-
tections are anomalous within RCEP countries, suggesting that social 
dimension provisions are generally scarce in the RCEP at large. Only 
South Korea, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Korea have labor pro-
visions, and these provisions are with non-Asian developed countries, 
such as the US. Interestingly, Japan's FTAs (called EPAs) , mention labor, 
but usually only state that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws.28 
Chinese leaders may see the establishment of RCEP as laying the 
foundations for a broader Free Trade Area of Asia Pacific (FTAAP), 
which could be a set of regional rules and norms inspired, at least in part, 
by Chinese leadership. It is reported that: 
FTAAP gains would be some eight times that of the twelve-nation 
TPP -close to $2 trillion by 2025 - and three times that of the RCEP 
being negotiated among the Southeast Asian (ASEAN) nations, 
which also includes China, India, Japan, Korea and Australia/New 
Zealand (known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship or RCEP).29 
28. See, e.g., Japan Country Commercial Guide, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INT'L 
TRADE ADMIN. (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.export.gov/article?id=Japan·Trade·Agree· 
ments [https://perma.ccIF749·K62Y); Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA), MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Oct. 12, 2017), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/[https://perma.cc/9S3M·EHEM). 
29. Hugh Stephens, TP P or FTAAP: What It Means for us and the Asia· Pacific 
Region, CHINA·US Focus (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.chinausfocus.comlfinance·econ· 
omy /tpp·or· ftaap· what· it ·means· for· us· and . the· asia· pacific· region/ [https://perma. 
cc/3EE4·3J83). "These gains, however, are predicated on an FTAAP model that bridg· 
es the TPP and RCEP templates. China-which is not among the TPP negotiating 
countries-has now become a leading advocate for the FTAAP." Id. 
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As the following analysis of Chinese FTAs will show, there is no 
basis to conclude that the RCEP would include a substantive labor provi-
sion. One could also speculate that pressures from China and other Asian 
countries will exist to make the FTAAP mirror that absence, though its 
impact would fall over a much larger swath of countries and regions and 
set a tone contrary to protecting the labor rights of workers. 
Three RCEP members, Australia, Korea, and Singapore, each have 
FTAs with the U.S. that include labor protection provisions.3D Singapore 
and Vietnam3! have bilateral FTAs with the European Union (EU), nei-
ther of which includes provisions for protection of international labor 
standards.32 This tends to underscore the reluctance of Asian countries 
to include labor protection provisions in their FTAs in these cases, even 
when dealing with major western states who most often include them. 
Also in effect is the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Austra-
lia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) entered into force in 
January 2010.33 Parties to the Agreement, in addition to Australia and 
New Zealand, are the countries of ASEAN - Brunei Darussalam, Cam-
bodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam.34 This FTA has no labor protections, but only 
30. Their FTAs are found in Article 18 of the 2004 US-Australia FTA, Article 
19 and Annex 19-A of the 2007 US-Korea FTA, and Article 17 of the 2003 US-Sin-
gapore FTA. United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, US-Austl. art. 18, May 
18, 2004, Office of the US. Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ 
uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asseCupload_file148_5168.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EW5A-R5MM); United States - Korea Free Trade Agreement, US.-S. Kor. art. 19, 
Annex 19-A, June 30, 2007, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ 
korus-fta/final-text [https://perma.ccN2M7-6KTT); United States _ Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement, US.- Sing. art. 17, May 6,2003, Office of the US. Trade Represen-
tative, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_up-
load_file708_ 4036.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N5P-39WC ). 




Vietnam has bilateral and regional FTAs with many countries across the 
Asia Pacific, including China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, In-
dia, Chile, and ASEAN, among others. Vietnam also is participating in 
the ... 16-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ne-
gotiations. It concluded an FTA with the EU in December 2015, but the 
agreement has not yet entered into force. 
32. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Re-
public of Vietnam on Trade Relations, US.-Viet., July 13,2000, Office of the US. Trade 
Representative, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US-VietN am-BilateralTradeAgree-
ment.pdf [https://perma.ccNZN5-TTRW); see also CETA Chapter by Chapter, EUR. 
COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2RG4-VFQM). 
33. Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Area, Feb. 27, 2009, ASS'N OF SE. ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.asean.org/storage/im-
ages/2013/economic/afta/ AANZFTA/ Agreement %20Establishing %20the %20 
AANZFTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC5W-FA45). 
34. Id. 
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includes the minor provision dealing with labor mobility in trade services, 
which is necessary for trading representatives to travel freely.35 
As mentioned above, Japan has FTAs, called Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), with RCEP members India, 
Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Mongolia, and Singapore.36 It also has an 
FTA with ASEAN.37 Japan does not usually include full labor protection 
provisions, nor are these labor provisions included in these agreements in 
Asia, except to facilitate movement of natural persons to assist in trade, 
and for the Philippines, to agree not to lower labor standards to encour-
age trade and investment.38 Korea also has an FTA with ASEAN, but 
there is no labor protection provision included.39 
Accordingly, while inter-Asian business grows and FTAs flour-
ish within Asia, the inclusion of social dimension provisions in FTAs or 
35. See id. at 132. 
36. Japan-Trade Agreements, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN. 
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.export.gov/article?id=Japan-Trade-Agreements [https:// 
perma.cc17BY9-987G); Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA), supra note 28. 
37. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA), supra note 28. 
38. Article 103 of the Japan-Philippines Economic Agreement states: 
1. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor 
laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not 
waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise der-
ogate from, such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces adherence 
to the internationally recognized labor rights referred to in paragraph 
2 below as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, ex-
pansion or retention of an investment in its Area. If a Party considers 
that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request 
consultations with the other Party and the Parties shall consult with a 
view to avoiding any such encouragement. 
2. For purposes of this Article, "labor laws" means each Party's laws or 
regulations that are directly related to the following internationally 
recognized labor rights: 
(a) the right of association; 
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory 
labor; 
(d) labor protections for children and young people, including a min-
imumage for the employment of children and the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms of child labor; and 
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, 
hours of work, and occupational safety and health. 
Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an Economic 
Partnership, Japan-Phil. Art. 103, Sept. 9, 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/epa0609/main. pdf [https://perma. 
cc/ZDH4-LHFV]. 
39. ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area, ASS'N OF SE. ASIAN NATIONS, http://www. 
asean.org/storage/images/2015/0ctober/outreach-document/Edited % 20AKFTA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8PGM-G5A2). 
14 PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs )40 is practically non -existent, unless 
there is a Western party to the FTA, such as in FTAs with South Korea 
and with Singapore.41 
B. China's FTAs and Labor Provisions 
A survey of Chinese FTAs catalogues that in mid-2015 "there were 
13 FTAs."42 Eight had no labor protection provisions (ASEAN,Asia-Pa-
cific, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Macau, Pakistan, Singapore, and Taiwan) 
and five included relatively minor labor protection standards (Chile, Ice-
land, New Zealand, Peru, and Switzerland).43 
40. See Ronald C. Brown, China-US. Implementation of ILO Standards by BITs 
and Pieces (FTAs), in FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR RIGHTS IN CHINA-LEGAL IMPLEMENTA-
TION AND CULTURAL LOGIC 169 (Ulia Liukkunen et al. eds., 2016). 
Id. 
Asian countries, particularly those in ASEAN, also conclude Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs), though none have Social Dimension Provi-
sions covering labor standards. The U.S. is currently in negotiations with 
China on a BIT which does contain a Social Dimension Provision on 
labor, which would be the first BIT with such a provision for China, if 
concluded. 
41. The parties reaffirm their ILO obligations and agree not to fail to effectively 
enforce its labor laws. See United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, supra note 
30. 
42. See Chittooran, supra note 16. Arguably, there are 16 FTAs, as China had 
three other FTAs negotiated and in effect (Taipei; China; South Korea; and Thailand) 
[see Chart 3 in Appendicesl, but they have not yet been notified to the WTO. None 
of these three contain a Social Dimension provision with labor protections. See also 
Free Trade Agreements (China), ASIAN REG'L INTEGRATION CTR., https:llaric.adb.org/ 
fta-country [https:llperma.cc/L6DM-A62Zl. The agreement with Taipei is an Eco-
nomic Cooperation Agreement. See People's Republic of China-Taipei, China Eco-
nomic Cooperation Framework Agreement, China-Taiwan, Sept. 12,2010, Asia Reg'l 
Integration Ctr., https:llaric.adb.org/fta/peoples_republic_oCchina-taipeichina_eco-
nomic_cooperation_framework3greement [https:llperma.cc/84WF-47RGl (signed 
and in effect, not yet notified to WTO); People's Republic of China-Thailand Free 
Trade Agreement, China-Thai., Oct. 2003, Asia Reg'l Integration Ctr., https:llaric. 
adb.org/fta/peoples-republic-of-china-thailand-free-trade-agreement [https:llperma. 
cc/KGE4-GSRHl (signed and in effect but not yet notified to the WTO); People's 
Republic of China-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, China-So Kor., Dec. 20, 
201S, Asia Reg'l Integration Ctr., https:llaric.adb.org/fta/peoples-republic-of-china-
korea-free-trade-agreement [https:llperma.cc/JJ9T-LC7Xl (signed and in effect but 
not yet notified to the WTO); Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea, China-So 
Kor., Jan. 6, 201S, United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3461 [https:llperma.ccIELS8-KJJMl. 
43. The 13 agreements are: Asia-Pacific, Hong Kong, Macau, ASEAN, Chile, 
Costa Rica, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, Peru, Taiwan, Iceland, and Switzerland. 
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement, Nov. 2, 200S, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Re-
public of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/yatai/xieyiwenben_en.pdf[https://perma.cc/ 
Y82T-9M2Yl; Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic and Partnership Arrange-
ment, China-H.K., June 29, 2003, World Bank Grp., https:llwits.woridbank.org/GP-
TAD/PDF/archive/China-HongKong.pdf [https:llperma.cc/NE24-STKSl); Mainland 
and Macao Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, China-Mac., Dec. 18,2014, 
Gov't of the Mac. Special Admin. Region Econ. Servs., http://www.economia.gov.mo/ 
2017] CHINESE STYLE GLOBAL TRADE 1S 
Of the five FTAs that have references to labor issues, three have 
references in MOUs instead of the FTAs (Chile, Peru, and Switzer-
land). These references are of dubious enforceability and merely call for 
or encourage labor cooperation, such as through workshops. The FTAs 
that reference labor protections are watered down and do not provide 
grounds for enforcement. For example, in its Agreement with China, Ice-
land agrees to enhanced labor communication and cooperation.44 The 
China-Chile FTA has a labor provision for cooperation referring to a 
MOU.45 The New Zealand-China Agreement does reaffirm the parties' 
obligations under the ILO, and it recognizes that it is inappropriate both 
public/docs/CEPA_ACBLCS/index/en/main_text.pdf [https:llperma.cc/SQJB-G2F3]; 
Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Co-Operation Between the People's Republic of China and The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, Jan. 14, 2007, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic 
of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/dongmeng/annex/xieyi2004en.pdf [https:llperma. 
cc/QHGS-BQ9S]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Chile, Chile-China art. 
lOS, Nov. 1S, 200S, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, http:// 
fta.mofcom.gov.cn/chile/xieyi/freetradexieding2.pdf [https:llperma.cc/E9LR-ASZ2]; 
People's Republic of China-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, China-Costa Rica, 
Apr. S, 2010, Org. of Am. States Foreign Trade Info. Sys., http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/ 
CRLCHN_FTA/Texts_Apr2010_e/CRLCHN_Core_texCen.pdf?bcsi_scan_7S23D-
FCE4641SF3E=0&bcsi_scan_filename=CRLCHN_Core_texCen.pdf [https:llperma. 
cc/2JGD-4JAY]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of New Zealand, China-N.Z., Apr. 7, 200S, 
N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, https:llwww.mfat.govt.nz/assetsIFTAs-
agreements-in-force/China-FTAlNZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf [https:llperma. 
cc/QSJL-GBP6]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the Islamic Re-
public of Pakistan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, China-Pak., 
Nov. 24, 2006, United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/273S [https:llperma.cc/SMEX-D6V3]; Free 
Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and 
the Government of the Republic of Singapore Trade Agreement, China-Sing., Oct. 2S, 
200S, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov. 
cnitopic/ensingapore.shtml [https:llperma.cc/S6EP-6SAQ]; Free Trade Agreement 
Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of 
Peru, China-Peru art. 161, Apr. 2S, 2009, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Re-
public of China http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex/bilu_xdwb_en.pdf [https:llperma. 
cc/X3PC-A244]); Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, Chi-
na-Taiwan, June 29, 2010, World Treaty Org. Reg'l Trade Agreements Info. Sys., http:// 
rtais.wto.orgirtadocs!713/TOA/English/Combined%20ECFA %20Text.pdf [https:11 
perma.cc/G6ZD-VLLB]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Government of Iceland, China-Ice. art. 96, Apr. 
1S, 2013, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom. 
gov.cn/iceland/xieyi/2013-4-17-en.pdf [https:llperma.cc/PYSF-3SDA]); Free Trade 
Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Swiss Confederation, 
China-Switz., July 6, 2013, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enswiss.shtml[https://perma.cc/2J4R-3YPC]. 
44. See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Re-
public of China and the Government of Iceland, supra note 43. 
4S. See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Re-
public of China and the Government of the Republic of Chile, supra note 43. 
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to encourage trade or investment by weakening or failing to enforce labor 
laws and also to set or use labor laws, regulations, policies and practices 
for trade protectionist purposes. However, despite this rhetoric, there is 
no enforcement mechanism.46 Thus, the Parties essentially agreed to two 
courses of action: they ratified some ILO conventions, and they agreed to 
cooperate and consult upon disagreement. However, these agreements 
lack an enforcement mechanism. This type of provision is compara-
ble with "soft law" approaches of CSR and codes of conduct where the 
46. See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and 
the Government of the People's Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 177 ("The 
Parties shall enhance their communication and cooperation on labour and environ-
ment matters through both the Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooper-
ation and the Environment Cooperation Agreement between the Parties."). See also 
Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooperation, China-N.Z., Apr. 7, 2008, 
N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, https:llwww.mfat.govt.nz/assetsIFTAs-
agreements-in-force/China-FTAlNZ-China-FTA-Labour-MOU.pdf [https:llperma.cc/ 
L6DJ-5J3Pj. The MOU on Labor states in part: 
Id. 
Considering the objectives of the International Labour Organisation of 
which the Parties are members .... 
Article 1 - General Provisions 
1. The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the ILO, in-
cluding their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Funda-
mental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up. 
2. The Parties respect their sovereign rights to set their own policies 
and national priorities and to set, administer and enforce their own 
labour laws and regulations. 
3. The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to set or use their la-
bour laws, regulations, policies and practices for trade protectionist 
purposes. 
Article 2 - Scope and Means of Cooperation 
1. Taking account of their national priorities and available resources, 
the Parties agree to cooperate on labour matters of mutual interest 
and benefit. The Parties shall jointly decide specific labour coopera-
tive activities. 
2. Cooperative activities may be in areas including but not limited to: 
(a) labour laws, policies and practices, including social dialogue, and 
raising the awareness of the legal rights and obligations of employers 
and employees, to realise decent work; 
(b) compliance and enforcement systems and labour inspection; 
(c) sound labour relations, including labour management consulta-
tion, cooperation and labour dispute settlement; 
(d) working conditions; 
(e )human capital development, training and employability; 
(f) promotion and protection of the employment rights and obliga-
tions of migrant workers. 
Article 4 - Consultations Should any issue arise over the interpretation 
or application of this Memorandum of Understanding, a Party may re-
quest consultation with the other Party, through the coordinator. The 
Parties will make every effort to reach a consensus on the matter through 
cooperation, consultation and dialogue. 
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parties are bound by rhetorical standards calling for cooperation, but are 
not bound by real legal obligations. 
C. China's Trade Practices 
Competition between the US. and China over the Asian market 
has mounted in recent years, as the US. pushed to adopt the TPP and 
as China has pushed for the RCEP. Leading up to and during 2016, 
the "$10-trillion Asian market [was] the most obvious prize [and] the 
economic benefits for the rest of the world could be staggering, but it 
depends on who writes the rules for trade."47 Given US. withdrawal, it 
appears China will write the rules. Supporters of the TPP would identify 
two shortcomings in having China, rather than the US., write the trade 
rules: the reliability of the rules48 and the absence of labor protections. 
Regarding reliability, critics argue that China's past trade prac-
tices reveal three key elements of China's domestic economic system: 
"exclusion; favoritism; and lower standards for labor and corruption."49 
The 2017 US. National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barri-
ers catalogues a myriad of concerns that support assertions of favoritism 
and industrial practices50 in US.-China trade, and it raises substantive 
47. Okun-Kozlowicki & Horwitz, supra note 6 ("[I]f the US. were to reclaim its 
historical share of these Asian markets, it would increase US. exports by almost $600 
billion in 2020 alone-supporting over 3 million jobs. Is this possible? It all depends 
on the rules for trade."). 
48. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 77-95 (2017), https:llustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/files/reports/2017 INTE/2017%20NTE.pdf [https:llperma.cc/3LTD-8WZH]. The 
USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance provides comprehensive 
information on the status of the trade and investment commitments that China has 
made through the United States-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade 
(JCCT) and the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). 
See OFFICE OF THE US. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINAS 
WTO COMPLIANCE (2016), https:llustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-China-Report-to-
Congress. pdf [https:llperma.cc/AMM9-35WT]. 
Id. 
Trade Summary. The US. goods trade deficit with China was $347.0 bil-
lion in 2016, a 5.5 percent decrease ($20.1 billion) over 2015. US. goods 
exports to China were $115.8 billion, down 0.3 percent ($297 million) 
from the previous year. Corresponding US. imports from China were 
$462.8 billion, down 4.2 percent. China was the United States' 3,d largest 
goods export market in 2016. US. exports of services to China were an 
estimated $48.4 billion in 2015 (latest data available) and US. imports 
were $15.1 billion. Sales of services in China by majority US.-owned af-
filiates were $54.9 billion in 2014 (latest data available), while sales of 
services in the United States by majority China-owned firms were $4.8 
billion. US. foreign direct investment in China (stock) was $74.6 billion 
in 2015 (latest data available), a 10.5 percent increase from 2014. US. 
direct investment in China is led by manufacturing, wholesale trade, and 
depository institutions. 
49. Okun-Kozlowicki & Horwitz, supra note 6. 
50. China continued to pursue a wide array of industrial policies in 2016 that 
seek to limit market access for imported goods, foreign manufacturers and foreign 
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and procedural questions about Chinese trade practices.51 These issues 
include limitations on market access in many areas, such as barriers to 
services (from banking to legal services ),52 barriers to digital trade,53 
barriers to agriculture (notwithstanding more than $21 billion in U.S. 
agricultural exports in 2016),54 and barriers to transparency in areas such 
as publication and translation of laws and regulations. 55 Finally, the report 
raises questions about China's legal framework itself providing barriers 
to fair trade. 56 
service suppliers, while offering substantial government guidance, resources and reg-
ulatory support to Chinese industries. The principal beneficiaries of these constantly 
evolving policies are China's state-owned enterprises, as well as other favored domes-
tic companies attempting to move up the economic value chain. 
2017 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 
48 at 80. 
51. Id. at 77-95. 
52. As in past years, Chinese regulators continued to use discriminatory regu-
latory processes, informal bans on entry and expansion, overly burdensome licensing 
and operating requirements, and other means to frustrate the efforts of U.S. suppliers 
of services, including banking services, insurance services, telecommunication services, 
Internet-related services (including cloud services), audiovisual services, express de-
livery services, legal services and other services to achieve their full market potential 
in China. Some sectors, including electronic payment services and theatrical film dis-
tribution, have been the subject ofWTO dispute settlement. While China declared an 
intent to further liberalize a number of services sectors in its Third Plenum Decision, 
no meaningful concrete steps have been taken. 
Id. at 86. 
53. Id. at 89 ("China's Internet regulatory regime is restrictive and non-trans-
parent, affecting a broad range of commercial services activities conducted via the 
Internet. In addition, China's treatment of foreign companies seeking to participate 
in the development of cloud computing services, including computer data and storage 
services provided over the Internet, raises concerns."). 
54. Notwithstanding this success, China remains among the least transparent and 
predictable of the world's major markets for agricultural products, largely because of 
uneven enforcement of regulations and selective intervention in the market by Chi-
na's regulatory authorities. Seemingly capricious practices by Chinese customs and 
quarantine agencies delay or halt shipments of agricultural products into China. San-
itary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures with questionable scientific bases or a gener-
ally opaque regulatory regime frequently have created difficulties and uncertainty for 
traders in agricultural commodities, who require as much certainty and transparency 
as possible. 
Id. at 91. 
55. See id. at 93. In 2017, the U.S. complaint in general terms was stated as 
follows: 
Id. 
One of the core principles reflected throughout China's WTO accession 
agreement is transparency. China's WTO transparency commitments in 
many ways required a profound historical shift in Chinese policies. Al-
though China has made strides to improve transparency following its ac-
cession to the WTO, there remains a lot more for China to do in this area. 
56. "Key areas include administrative licensing, competition policy, the treat-
ment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), commercial dispute resolution, 
labor laws and laws governing land use. Corruption among Chinese government offi-
cials, enabled in part by China's incomplete adoption of the rule of law, is also a key 
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Although each country has its own unique concerns with its trading 
partners, there seems to be a consensus in western countries that China 
has yet to make its trading approaches consistently fair. In 2016, due to 
China's trading practices on dumping57, the "EU Parliament members for 
that reason voted against the granting of market economy status (MES) 
to China."58 An alliance of 30 European industrial associations, AEGIS, 
said the European Parliament's signal could not be clearer; "[A] fair 
partnership is only possible if China plays by the rules of free and fair 
international trade, and honours its WTO obligations."59 
Authors Gabe Horwitz and Jeff Okun-Kozlowicki, drawing on past 
National Trade Estimates report, argue that U.S. trade rules are preferable 
to China's.6o They reduce the perceived deficiencies in China's U.S. trade 
policies into the three categories mentioned above: exclusion, favoritism, 
and lower standards for labor and corruption.61 Regarding exclusion (or 
transparency), they state that under these practices, outside businesses 
would be susceptible to discrimination and complete market uncertainty. 
Chinese trade policy closes off markets through hidden discrim-
ination and tricky rules. Foreign exporters, investors, and service 
providers are routinely kept at bay through screening mechanisms, 
mandatory joint ventures, requirements to transfer proprietary 
technologies, and outright bans. In addition, the government often 
administers regulations in an opaque, discriminatory manner and 
designs industry standards to favor Chinese companies. In contrast, 
the United States features transparent, open markets where all busi-
nesses know the rules.62 
Chinese restrictions on FDI affect trade through screening and 
other procedural and bureaucratic devices, and this led to a recent study 
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) ranking China as the second most restrictive country for FDI, 
concern." Id. at 94. 
57. See Alanna Petroff, Europe Steps Up Its Fight Against Cheap Chinese Steel, 
CN.N. (May 12, 2017, 10:50 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/12/news/economy/ 
china-steel-europe-dumpinglindex.html [https:llperma.cc/H3PW-4MFE]; China Frets 
Over New EU Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel, EURACTIV.COM (Feb. 28, 2017), https:11 
www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/china-frets-over-new-eu-anti-dump-
ing-duties-on-steell [https:llperma.cc/2EWT-KZHH]. 
58. MEPs Vote Against Market Economy Status for China, EUBuSINESS. 
COM (May 13, 2016, 2:49 PM), http://www.eubusiness.comlnews-eu/china-mes.121ag 
[https:llperma.cc/KB9H-WKVX] ("In a non-legislative resolution passed by 546 votes 
to 28, [EU Parliament members] said that until China fulfils [sic] the EU's five criteria 
for market economy status, its exports to the EU must be treated in a 'non-standard' 
way."). 
59. Nick Prag, MEPs Defend EU Industry Against China's Unfair Trade Practic-
es, EUBuSINESS.COM (May 12,2016,10:25 PM), http://www.eubusiness.com/Members/ 
nickpraglchina-trade-mes [https:llperma.cc/AU9R-2HDE] (quoting AEGIS Europe 
Spokesman Milan Nitzschke). 
60. Okun-Kozlowicki & Horwitz, supra note 6. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
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below Indonesia.63 As chronicled above in the U.S. 2017 National Trade 
Estimates, China operates under opaque laws and regulations, which 
limits the number of available industries and adds onerous regulatory 
barriers to qualification and licensing requirements. 
In terms of fairness and favoritism, it is apparent that China's lim-
iting policies affecting trade preserve work for domestic workers and 
favor domestic companies. China's favoritism includes preference of 
local companies over foreign companies operating in China. In addi-
tion, China relies on State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) for set-aside 
pieces of the core economy (e.g., telecommunications). Government 
subsidies and preference afforded to these SOEs further reflects favor-
itism and a lack of fair trade. In 2011, "the 113 central SOEs controlled 
by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commis-
sion (SASAC) alone accounted for 66 percent of China's non-financial 
FDI outflows and 76 percent of the country's non-financial outward FDI 
stock."64 As mentioned in the National Trade Estimate report and the U.S. 
State Department's Investment Climate Statement - China, China also 
reportedly uses its anti-trust laws in an inconsistent manner that works 
to restrict competition.65 
Current labor standards and protections in China may also affect 
FDI trading partners. Domestic labor laws have progressed since the 
implementation of China's first comprehensive labor law in 1994 and 
later reforms in 2007.66 China's current labor and employment laws are 
modern and comprehensive; however, there are numerous problems 
with effective implementation and enforcement: there is only one trade 
union that does not allow competition; political considerations are not 
sufficiently separated from legal rules in "sensitive" cases; and there are 
vast inconsistencies across China's political-legal system, especially in 
enforcement, as the system permits provincial governments and courts 
to interpret and implement national laws. As a result, there have been 
numerous reports of unenforced, widespread labor violations and abuses 
in both domestic and foreign operated enterprises.67 In 2015, the Interna-
63. Until 2015, OECD ranked China as the most restrictive. The FDI Regu-
latory Restrictiveness Index (FDI Index) measures statutory restrictions on foreign 
direct investment in 62 countries, including all OECD and 020 countries, and cov-
ers 22 sectors. FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV. (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm[https://perma.cc/ 
F6QT-8EUH]. 
64. Karl P. Sauvant & Michael D. Nolan, China's Outward FDI and International 
Investment Law, 18 1. INT'L ECON. L. 893, 895 (2015). 
65. U.s. DEP'T OF STATE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENTS FOR 2017 - CHINA 
(2017), h ttps:1 Iwww.state.gov/e/eb/rls/ othr/ics/investmentclimates tatements/index. 
htm ?year=2017 &dlid=269807#wrapper. 
66. RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA 
(2010). But see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 
FOR 2016 - CHINA 67-75 (2016), https:llwww.state.gov/documents/organization/265540. 
pdf [https:llperma.cc/XV73-7K78]. 
67. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACfICES FOR 2016 - CHINA, supra note 66. 
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tional Trade Union Confederation68 (ITUC) included China in its list of 
the top ten countries with the worst record for labor rights, while the US. 
was ranked in the second worst category of three groupings.69 The survey 
evaluates all labor rights for all employees, including enforcement. 
While it is true that China has ratified more ILO core labor stan-
dard conventions than the US., many observers would agree that labor 
standards and law enforcement function more consistently in the US. 
than in China. This perception is arguably influenced by cultural views 
about law. In the US., there is a strong belief in the "rule of law" as an 
important democratic tool, which operates under a constitution and is 
enforceable by a multi-tiered court system. China is different. Its "rule by 
law" operates through a political party, not under a constitution. Because 
of this, notions of due process are flimsy and subject to the whims of 
the judiciary, who may suffer from localism and corruption.70 Much like 
these cultural differences in the approach to law, the US. makes a point 
to include labor protection provisions in its FTAs, while China generally 
does not. In addition, unlike China, the US. is a member of the OECD, 
which has labor protection requirements. 
Corruption may be one of the most significant corrosive forces 
impeding fair trade, as it is antithetical to the concept of an even playing 
field. With China's current trade practices of exclusion, favoritism, and 
low labor standards operating under selective enforcement, countries 
trading with China may find it difficult to project costs and act according 
to the rules and practices laid out under Chinese influence in the RCEP. 
Currently, one organization ranks China 79th of 176 countries in an index 
referencing comparisons of international perception of corruption, while 
the US. ranks 18th.71 
68. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) is a confederation of 
national trade union centers, that has 328 affiliated organization in 162 countries and 
territories on all five continents, with a membership of 176 million and is a partner in 
"Global Unions" together with the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD 
and the Global Union Federations (GUFs) which link together national unions from 
a particular trade or industry at international level. The ITUC has specialized offices 
in many countries around the world, and has General Consultative Status with the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. INT'L TRADE UNION CONFED., 
THE 2015 ITUC GLOBAL RIGHTS INDEX: THE WORLD'S WORST COUNTRIES FOR WORKERS 
3 (2015). 
69. Id. at 12-16. 
70. See RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PRO-
CESS: LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACfERISTICS 133-39 (1997). 
71. The non-governmental organizational, Transparency International, states 
that "[o]ver two-thirds of the 176 countries and territories in the 2016 index fall below 
the midpoint of the scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean)." China's score was 
40, tied with India; the U.S. score was 74. The global average score is 43, indicating 
endemic corruption in a country's public sector. Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, 
TRANSPARENCY INT'L (Jan. 25, 2017), https:llwww.transparency.org/news/feature/ cor-
ruption_perceptions_index_2016 [https:llperma.ccIN7SN-SABF]; see also COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2016 - CHINA, supra note 66. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Comparing the Chinese Approach to the United States: RCEP and 
TPP 
Considering its dubious record, China will likely continue its cur-
rent practice of forgoing social dimension provisions and meaningful 
labor protection provisions in its FTAs. This practice may first manifest 
in the RCEP, which is currently being negotiated.72 While many ana-
lysts think China became the primary promoter of the RCEP in order to 
implement its own trade rules, not all agree.73 Some reports suggest that 
China promoted the RCEP to broaden the FTAAP: "Chinese leaders 
see the establishment of RCEP as laying the foundation for a broader 
FTAAP, which could be seen as a set of regional rules and norms inspired, 
at least in part, by Chinese leadership."74 With the U.S. default on TPP, it 
has been suggested that "RCEP is poised to 'set the rules of the game' 
in the region."75 Elms suggests that in lieu of the ASEAN, China will be 
tagged with whatever happens in RCEP and will be viewed as the "de 
facto" leader of the new FTA. China should therefore be concerned with 
getting a strong conclusion, in the form of a final agreement, to show 
that they can deliver leadership on trade.76 . With the U.S. withdrawing 
72. See Jyoti Panday, RCEP Discussions on Ecommerce: Gathering Steam 
in Hyderabad, ELEc. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 24, 2017), https:llwww.eff.org/deep-
links/20 17/07 Ircep-discussions-ecommerce-gathering -steam-hyderabad [https:llper-
ma.cc/6KTF-3Z2Ul; see also Subhayan Chakraborty, RCEP Negotiations May Drag 
on Beyond 2017, Bus. STANDARD (May 24, 2017), http://www.business-standard.com/ar-
ticlel economy-policylrcep-negotiations-may-drag-on-beyond-2017-117052400048_l. 
html [https:llperma.cc/4CYE-PNUHl. 
73. China has been an active participant in RCEP, but it has not been driving 
the negotiations. ASEAN has been setting the agenda. The senior official in charge 
has been Indonesian. Despite press reports from the beginning that RCEP has been 
China-led, this has not been the case. However, with the United States backing away 
from trade in Asia, China now has every incentive to get an agreement in RCEP. 
Deborah Elms, RCEP: Looking Ahead to 2017,AsIAN TRADE CTR. (Dec. 14, 2016), 
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/ Ircep-looking -ahead-to-20 17 [https:11 
perma.cc/5KAJ-B58Nj. This could be partly based on the internal negotiating pro-
cesses where it is stated that the "ten countries of ASEAN meet to determine their po-
sition in any given set of issues or chapter. Then, all 16 parties come together to talk. 
This multi-stage approach has helped keep ASEAN 'in the driver's seat' in RCEP 
thus far." I d. 
74. BROCK R. WILLIAMS ET AL., CONGo RESEARCH SERV., THE TRANS-PACIFIC PART-
NERSHIP: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS (2016), https:llwww.fas.org/sgp/crs/row!R4436l.pdf 
[https:llperma.cc/2XFW-S4CUl· 
75. Elms, supra note 73. 
Id. 
The agreement itself contains about a dozen chapters covering market 
access for goods, services, and investment. It includes competition, in-
tellectual property, e-commerce, financial services, telecommunications, 
and customs. There are some new rules for standards, a chapter for fa-
cilitating small and medium sized enterprises, and one for assisting with 
capacity building and development objectives. 
76. Id. "ASEAN would like to conclude negotiations in 2017 to coincide with 
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from the TPP, the RCEP is the remaining "rulebook" for lowering tariffs 
and facilitating growth in member states. However, some argue that the 
RCEP lacks some of the "lofty goals" set for the TPP, including worker 
protections and tools for targeting corruption. The following provisions 
of the TPP set up an eventual contrast with RCEP when RCEP finds its 
final form. Viola Zhou, in the South China Morning Post, summarizes 
the distinctions.77 Regarding labor standards, "TPP countries are required 
to ensure a list of labor rights recognized by the International Labour 
Organisation."78 As TPP negotiations continue, it is reported there will 
be labor protections included in the new Tpp79 In the realm of environ-
mental protection, "[t]he TPP requires its member countries to enforce 
the SOth anniversary of ASEAN. ASEAN member states would surely prefer to avoid 
a light, disappointing outcome and better live up to their own sweeping rhetoric of 
regional integration." Id. 
The Ministers from the 16 RCEP Participating Countries (RPCs) attend-
ed the 3,d RCEP Intersessional Ministerial Meeting held on 21-22 May 
2017 in Ha Noi, Viet Nam to take stock of the status of RCEP negotia-
tions including the challenges faced following the conclusion of the 18th 
round of negotiations held on 2-12 May 2017 in Pasay City, Philippines. 
The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to meet the Leaders' man-
date for a swift conclusion of the RCEP negotiations in delivering the vi-
sion In the Guiding Principles and Objectives for the RCEP Negotiations. 
Joint Media Statement from 16 RCEP Participating Countries on the outcome 
of the May 2017 RCEP Intersessional Ministerial Meeting (May 22, 2017), http://ase-
an.org/storage/2017/0S/RCEP-3ISSL-MM-JMS-FINAL-220S2017.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/83QD-S83N]. 
77. Viola Zhou, TPF, Unlike China's RCEF, Has Goals on Worker Protection, 
Corruption, Environment, C.N.B.C., Nov. 23, 2016, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/23/ 
tpp-unlike-chinas-rcep-has-goals-on-worker-protection-corruption-environment. 
html [https://perma.cc/ESD7-NFKL]. 
78. Id. "These include working to protect collective bargaining, eliminating 
forced labor and abolishing child labor and employment discrimination. The signato-
ries are also required to introduce laws governing minimum wages, hours of work and 
occupational safety and health." Id. 
Under the TPp, negotiators: 
brokered side agreements with Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei on the 
enforcement of labor standards. These deals would allow the U.S. to re-
instate tariffs if the countries break commitments. The nations all have 
business climates that are generally regarded as hostile to workers: Viet-
nam is a communist dictatorship that bans independent unions and has 
minimum wages as low as roughly $100 a month in some regions; in Ma-
laysia, nearly 1 in 3 migrant workers was employed in a forced situation, 
according to an independent study released last year; Brunei's legal code 
prescribes a death sentence for homosexuality, let alone allows LGBT 
people to serve openly on the job. 
Cole Stangler, Will the Trans-Pacific Partnership Improve Labor Standards?, 
INT'L Bus. TIMES, Oct. S, 201S, http://www.ibtimes.com/will-trans-pacific-partner-
ship-improve-labor-standards-2127388 [https://perma.cc/X24S-472J]; see Ronald C. 
Brown, Mega-Regionalism, supra note 12. 
79. Takenaka & Tostevin, supra note 4. It is reported that, "the TPP agreement 
has provisions for protecting the environment, workers' rights and intellectual prop-
erty - one of the major sticking points after the departure of the United States." Id. 
24 PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1 
laws to protect endangered species. . .. Under the TPP, governments 
must encourage companies to adopt corporate social responsibility pol-
icies that benefit the environment."8o Further, "[ s ]tate-owned companies 
in TPP states must make purchases and sales on the basis of commer-
cial considerations."81 On free information flow, "[t]he TPP's e-commerce 
section includes assurances that companies and consumers can access 
and move data freely, in order to support the digital economy.82 Finally, 
on the subject of anti-corruption, "TPP nations are required to classify 
acts of bribery and corruption as criminal offences."83 
On a comparative note, RCEP, in its role as a commercial FTA, does 
offer some regional coherency in trade and has been described as follows: 
The RCEP, however, is largely about ensuring order among the more 
limited and somewhat inconsistent trade rules in ASEAN's FTAs 
with major regional economies. At the RCEP's core is a goods agree-
ment which aims to harmonize tariff schedules and rules of origin for 
Asia's sophisticated global supply chains. The partnership also seeks 
to improve market access in services and investment as well as intro-
duce a dispute settlement procedure. 
The RCEP seems more development-friendly than the TPP. It prom-
ises special and differential treatment for developing economies 
which may make it easier for them to join the bloc. This implies 
gradual tariff liberalization and longer transition times for impover-
ished countries like Cambodia and Myanmar. The pact also promises 
80. Zhou, supra note 76. 
The members commit to combat illegal trade in wildlife, plants and fish 
as well as sharing information with other member states to investigate 
wildlife trafficking. Member countries will also promote the long-term 
conservation of species at risk, such as sharks, sea turtles, seabirds and 
marine mammals. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership failure may be China's gain, Asia's loss[.] [Under the 
TPP ... t]he member states would also eliminate tariffs on environmental goods and 
facilitate trade in environmental services. Id. 
81. Id.: 
TPP governments also agree to ensure that their SOEs do not discriminate 
against the enterprises, goods or services of other countries. Governments are for-
bidden from using their regulatory authorities to provide preferential treatment to 
their SOEs. The TPP requires that countries do not hurt the interests of other member 
states when they provide non-commercial assistance, such as loans or equity capital, 
to their SOEs. 
82. Id. ("The U.S. government said the measures would help prevent unreason-
able restrictions, such as the arbitrary blocking of websites. The trade agreement also 
guarantees that companies would not be required to build local data centers in every 
market they seek to serve."). 
83. Id.: 
People who bribe officials or public servants who solicit bribes in 
trade-related matters must be punished, under the terms of the deal. The 
member states must work to decrease conflicts of interest between the 
government and private companies. The TPP also attempts to increase 
transparency, requiring countries to make their trade laws and regula-
tions available to others. Member states must seek comments from other 
TPP members before adopting new trade regulations. 
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development assistance through economic and technical coopera-
tion provisions. The TPP, meanwhile, applies the same high-standard 
trade rules for developed and developing countries .... 
Manufacturing, global value chains and services are likely beneficia-
ries [emphasis added] while agriculture and mining may lose out. 
As differences exist in assumptions and model structure, these stud-
ies are indicative, rather than strictly accurate. Furthermore, these 
projections represent the minimum benefits as CGE models do not 
incorporate adequately many of the high-standard rules particularly 
in the TPP in sectors such as investment, intellectual property, labor 
and environment.84 
25 
Following up on this comparison between the TPP and RCEP, it 
has been argued that "every U.S. trade deal since 200085 has stronger 
labor protections, enforcement, and monitoring mechanisms than all Chi-
nese deals."86 
84. Ganeshan Wignaraja, Opinion, A Tale of Two Trade Pacts in Asia: TPP and 
RCEP, NIKKEI ASIAN REV., June 2, 2016, https:llwww.adb.org/news/op-ed/tale-two-
trade-pacts-asia-tpp-and-rcep-ganeshan-wignaraja [https:llperma.cc/345V-MM45] 
(Ganeshan Wignaraja is adviser in the economic research and regional cooperation 
department of the Asian Development Bank). 
While both agreements will generate notable income benefits, larger 
gains arise from the more ambitious TPP. Projections by the Asian De-
velopment Bank, generated from a multi-country, multi-sector comput-
able general equilibrium model, indicate that the RCEP provides global 
income benefits of about $260 billion. Similar studies of the TPP project 
larger global income benefits of $320 billion to $400 billion. 
Id. At any rate, the developing countries' FDI will likely benefit from increased 
trade under either agreement. Tim Buthe & Helen V. Milner, The Politics of Foreign 
Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through Internation-
al Trade Agreements? 52 AM. 1. POL. SCI. 741 (2008). CGE is Computable General 
Equilibrium modeling. See Understanding a Computable General Equilibrium Model, 
INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, http://WWW.iadb.org/en/toPics/trade/understanding-a-comput-
able_general_eqUilibrium_model.1283.html[httPs://Perma.cC/GL9W_UL58]. 
85. US. trade deals since 2000 include Jordan (2001), Chile, (2004), Singapore 
(2004), Australia (2005), Bahrain (2006), El Salvador (2006), Guatemala (2006), Hon-
duras (2006), Morocco (2006), Nicaragua (2006), Dominican Republic (2007), Costa 
Rica (2009), Oman (2009), Peru (2009), Colombia (2012), Korea (2012), and Panama 
(2012). Chittooran, supra note 16. Early US. labor provisions stipulated that each par-
ty must effectively enforce their own labor laws pursuant to the agreed upon inter-
nationally recognized worker rights and each country could not relax labor laws in a 
way that adversely affected trade. Eventually, after the so-called May 10 agreement 
in 2007, all US. FTA labor provisions included requirements that all parties adopt 
and maintain the rights set forth in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work - and prevented any country from lowering their labor standards, 
prevented countries from using limited resources as a basis for non-compliance, and 
provided a dispute mechanism for labor or trade violations to institute trade sanctions 
on top of monetary penalties. Id.; see also Brown, Asian and US Perspectives, supra 
note 13. Under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, the President 
is required to submit reports to Congress on labor rights in each US. FTA. Bipartisan 
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002,19 US.c. §§ 3801-3813 (2002). 
86. Chittooran, supra note 16. 
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In sum, these comparisons critique China's reported trade practices 
relating to business and government dealings, legal issues, and lack of 
labor protection provisions. The RCEP, arguably, is a recipe for continued 
low labor standards in Asia and serves to encourage MNCs to increas-
ingly use Asian countries as a hub for overseas labor supply chains. 
B. Expectations under China's Global Leadership and Future 
Alternatives? 
1. Expectations 
Donald Trump's unexpected withdrawal from the TPP has cre-
ated a "global halt" and paused the U.S.'s "global pivot" towards Asia. 
At this juncture, it is unlikely that the formerly anticipated blending of 
U.S. and Asian Perspectives, with inclusions of social dimension provi-
sions, will occur. This "global halt" renders early, optimistic predictions 
for increased labor protections premature. 
The "Us. perspective" including labor protections does not auto-
matically advance international labor rights "on the ground," but it does 
enhance their visibility and presumably their eventual advancement. The 
"Asian Perspective" would seem to be anachronistic in the face of argu-
able advancement in the global quest for social dialogue and decent work 
environments.87 
While one can hope for a recognition of the need to protect human 
rights and institute labor protections in this sector, there is much to sug-
gest this will not occur. A commercial Asian Perspective that apparently 
"green-lights" MNC labor supply chains with massive FDI in countries 
with underdeveloped labor laws or laws with lax enforcement means that 
other methods will be necessary to establish and enforce labor rights. It 
is plausible that global withdrawal of attention from labor provisions in 
FTAs will effectively downgrade labor-related protections of those work-
ing in the RCEP countries. 
If China is to be the global leader of trade in Asia, its prior lack 
of commitment on labor issues in Asia suggests that it willnot pro-
mote labor and human rights protections in FTAs. However, dynamic 
leadership may bring a new sense of responsibility. China is capable of 
changing and promoting a decent work place for Chinese and Asian 
workers by means already at its disposal, including legal reforms and 
labor protections in FTAs.88 
87. Brown, Asian and US Perspectives, supra note 13, at 116-17. Perhaps there-
after there could be some liaison with EU expanding the RCEP to an even more 
global undertaking. "The EU and APEC do certainly have important differences. The 
former is based on the obligations of member states and is partly governed by vari-
ous supranational institutions such as the European Commission, while the latter is a 
group of 21 economies that voluntarily cooperate." George N. Tzogopoulos, EU and 
APEC Well Set to Work Together, GLOBAL TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, www.globaltimes.cn/ 
content/890217.shtml [https:llperma.cc/N69T-GZTMj. 
88. China does have an FTA with New Zealand that has a labor provision; per-
haps that weakened version could be used by China as a start toward providing labor 
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Because the US. President has abdicated global leadership and 
stated that he is "putting America first" while threatening a pullback for 
global economic expansion, alternative labor protections are needed for 
Asian workers in this new reality. Perhaps the TPP will be revived and 
implemented. According to Australian Trade Minister Steven Ciobo, a 
TPP without America's involvement could be resurrected with only a 
minor tweak.89 Australian Trade Minister Ciobo is negotiating the contin-
uation of TPP with Japan and others and speaks strongly of the need to 
go forward, also noting this may cause some concern in China. 
[T]he Chinese Communist Party will not be pleased with any of this. 
After America withdrew from the TPP, conventional wisdom was 
that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)-
China's signature Regional FTA - would increase China's economic 
influence and bring its trading partners more tightly into Beijing's 
orbit. But the revival of the TPP could undermine the influence of 
the RCEP-something Japan is working hard to achieve. Not only 
is the RCEP seen as a policy tool to promote Beijing's geopolitical 
agenda, it lacks the depth and quality of the TPP. Besides being full-
fledged members of the TPP, New Zealand, Australia, Singapore and 
others, are also members of the RCEP. As elements of the RCEP 
are still being negotiated, Beijing may be forced to accept higher, 
more demanding trade standards, with the revived TPP serving as 
a benchmark.90 
2. Future Alternatives 
Some alternatives are obvious and easy. First, the parties to the 
TPP could go ahead with the treaty without US. participation, just as 
the world has done with the Paris Climate Accord after the US. Presi-
dent withdrew the US. from it. The TPP could counterbalance the RCEP 
and, as opined by Australia Trade Minister Ciobo, could bring a blend-
ing of higher standards, since there is an overlapping of members in each 
FTA. The TPP could then be blended with RCEP as a basis for creating 
a multi-regional mega-FTA, the FTAAP, using labor provisions from the 
TPP as a floor of minimum standards and permitting a possible blending 
of East-West approaches on FTA protection of labor rights. In addition 
to Australia and Canada, mentioned above, Japan is also quite interested 
in moving forward with the TPp'91 It has been reported that in May 2017: 
protections? See Brown, FTAs In Asia-Pacific, supra note 12. 
89. PatriciaRanald,TheTP Pis an Even WorseDealWithoutthe US andShouldbeAban-
doned,DoN'TTRADEOuRLrvEsAwAY(May4,2017),https:lldonttradeoUrlivesaway.wordpress. 
coml2017/05/04/the-tpp-is-an-even-worse-deal-without-the-us-and-should-be-abandoned. 
90. Alex Capri, The TPP Moves Forward Without Trump'sAmerica,FoRBEs (May 
22, 2017, 1:30 PM), https:llwww.forbes.comlsites/alexcapri/2017/05/22/the-tpp-moves-
forward-without-trumps-america/#dc51f124fedO [https:llperma.cc!W568-NB9]. 
91. Since the January 23,d announcement, the group of TPP-ll nations have 
continued to explore options on if and how the TPP agreement could be moved for-
ward. On March 16, 2017, TPP-11 officials met in Chile and issued a call supporting an 
expansion of trade between Asia and the Americas. In April, Canada ... [hosted] a 
meeting of the Chief Negotiators from the TPP-ll nations. In May, on the sidelines 
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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was declaring that, though he 
still hoped-for America's return to the TPP, Japan was willing to take 
the lead in bringing the deal to fruition. Soon after, Japan and New 
Zealand announced that they would seek an agreement with other 
signatories by November 2017 to move the TPP forward.92 
Japan's discussions about reviving the TPP talks started in July 2017, 
without the U.S.: 
Countries that signed up to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
have sent representatives to Japan to work on an agreement this 
week-without the United States. They're hoping to have a proposal 
ready for trade ministers at November's [2017] APEC meeting in 
Vietnam. One of the points of opposition to the TPP was giving con-
cessions to the US.93 
It was reported that on November 11,2017, the 11 members ofTPP 
absent the U.S. agreed to continue working on the proposed dea1.94 The 
final signing of the TPP Agreement-in-Principle was temporarily post-
poned on November 10,2017, due to Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's 
desire to continue talks on Canada's auto industry issue. Talks are to be 
continued to finalize the agreement, now called the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.95 
[Negotiators] agreed on some basics of what they called the Com-
prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP). Partly to counter China's growing dominance in Asia, 
Japan had been lobbying hard for the TPP pact .... Canada, which 
has the second biggest economy among remaining TPP countries 
after Japan, had said it wanted to ensure an agreement that would 
protect jobs. As well as the cuts to tariffs, the TPP agreement has 
of the APEC Trade Ministers meeting, Vietnam ... [hostedl a meeting of the Trade 
Ministers from the TPP-11 nations." 
Strategic Interests of Participating US and Southeast Asian Economies, US-ASE-
AN Bus. COUNCIL, INC. (June 5, 2017), https:llwww.usasean.orgiregions/tpp/strate-
gic-interests [https:llperma.ccNKDS-GZ27l. The U.S.-ASEAN Business Council 
Report continued with discussions of the possible continuing interests of Malaysia, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei. Id. By contrast, Jusuf Kalla, Indonesian Vice Presi-
dent, says Indonesia "lost interest' in TPP without the US, but President Joko Widodo 
in 2015 told then-U.S. President Barack Obama that his government intended to join 
once the members ratified and implemented the deal. "[Tlhe vice president said Indo-
nesia remains supportive of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or 
RCEP." Shotaro Tani, Indonesia has 'Lost Interest' in TPP Without US, Vice President 
Says, NIKKEI ASIAN REV., June 5, 2017, http://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Future-
of-Asia -2017 IIndonesia -has-lost-interest-in-TPP-without-US-vice-president-says 
[https:llperma.cc/5B7A-YSF3l· 
92. Hamada, supra note S. 
93. Pete George, Talks on TPP Minus USA, YOUR NZ (July 3, 2017), https:11 
yournz.org/20 17/07 103/talks-on -tpp-minus-usaf [https:llperma.cc/63YE-LX5Nl. 
94. Takenaka & Tostevin, supra note 4. 
95. Andy Blatchford, Canada's Decision to Decline TPP Agreement Shouldn't 
Have Been Surprise: Trudeau, CTV NEWS (Nov. 11, 2017, 9:21 AM), http://www.ct-
vnews.ca/business/canada -s-decision -to-decline-tpp-agreement -shouldn -t -have-been-
surprise-trudeau-1.3673545. 
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provIsIOns for protecting the environment, workers' rights and 
intellectual property-one of the major sticking points after the 
departure of the United States.96 
29 
With continuing uncertainty over U.S. trade policy under the Trump 
administration, there's rising interest in how a regional trade deal could 
also increase security.97 Japan and the EU just completed the Japan-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) with the ratification pro-
cesses yet to be accomplished as of August 2017.98 Although this is an 
Asian-Western trade agreement, with labor provisions99 included in the 
unofficial text, it raises significant political challenges. 
The economics of the deal speaks for itself -Japan is the EU's 
second biggest trading partner in Asia after China. Together the EU 
and Japan account for more than a third of the world's ODP. JEEPA 
also illustrates the two parties' commitment to advance global trade 
liberalization without the United States if needed. In so doing, they 
are also sending a clear message to Washington: get on board or risk 
getting left behind. It might also provide momentum for TPP imple-
mentation without U.S. participation, and it helps set a high bar for 
Japan's talks in the Asia-Pacific region on the Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership CRCEP). Tokyo might also hope that a 
trade deal with the EU will put pressure to bring the Trump adminis-
tration back to the TPP negotiation table, although that seems to be 
a remote possibility.lOO 
96. Takenaka & Tostevin, supra note 4. 
97. See generally Hamada, supra note 8. 
What Trump fails to recognize is that, while a small country may feel intimidated 
by the US at the negotiating table, it can still stand up and walk away. More impor-
tantly, even if the US can use its weight to secure more favorable provisions in a bilat-
eral negotiating context, the benefits do not necessarily outweigh those of larger-scale 
agreements. That is certainly the case with the TPp, which contained some provisions 
that were highly beneficial for the US economy. Specifically, the agreement would 
have given US businesses access to markets that had long been largely closed. The 
provisions on intellectual property rights, accounting, and conflict resolution were so 
favorable to Wall Street and US lawyers that they have been criticized for being unfair 
to the other parties. They were agreed on, however, because of the expectation that 
China would eventually have to adhere to those standards. 
Id. 
98. Preliminary Text of E.U.-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement on Sus-
tainable Development, Eur. Union-Japan, Eur. Comm'n, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclibl docs/2017 Ijuly Itradoc_155726. pdf [https:llperma.cc/J560-ZMTPl. 
99. This draft version affirms ILO obligations and agrees to non-derogation of 
labor rights to facilitate trade, among other similar provisions. See id. at 1. 
100. Erik Brattberg & James L. Schoff, Can the EU-Japan Deal Prompt a us. Re-
calibration on Trade?, DIPLOMAT, July 12,2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017 107 Ican-the-
eu-japan-deal-prompt-a-us-recalibration-on-tradel [https:llperma.cc/K8CR-MAPPl. 
[Tlhe agreement between the EU and Japan is nevertheless a significant 
milestone. It raises the question of whether global trade liberalization is 
possible in the absence of leadership from Washington. In particular, is 
it possible to form an enhanced strategic partnership between the EU 
and Japan on the one hand, joined by like-minded states on the other, 
as either a substitute for U.S. leadership in the areas of trade and global-
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Other approaches are available. The ILO is capable of helping to 
coordinate the labor provisions of FTAs, when they exist, by incorpo-
rating the lessons it has learned in balancing tri-partite interests. lOl The 
ILO is also experienced in establishing pools of funds and programs that 
will compensate victims when labor standards are not met and calami-
ties happen, such as in Rana Plaza in Bangladesh.102 In the interim, the 
ILO can proceed by monitoring compliance of its core labor standards 
that have already been ratified by RCEP member countries. It is even 
possible that there could be future EU involvement, by using APEC to 
increase economic integration and by drawing on the lessons presented 
by the RCEp'103 
The OECD's involvement with businesses and the MNCs involved 
in FDI and trade and the labor standards it promotes, could be a useful 
extra-governmental standards-body to supplement FTA requirements in 
individual MNC cases with those MNCs based in OECD member coun-
tries. Current OECD members who are prospective RCEP members 
include Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. 104 Being devel-
oped countries, these OECD members will be more likely to have MNCs 
that use labor in China and in the underdeveloped countries that have 
underdeveloped labor law protections. 
Over the past few decades, MNCs have engaged in self-regulation 
using "soft law," such as voluntary codes of conduct and corporate social 
responsibility provisions. More recently, however, there is an evolving 
interest in "hard law" legislation to increase the legal responsibility of 
MNCs and their subcontractors for the wellbeing of foreign workers on 
the labor supply chain. !Os For example, in France, there is domestic leg-
islation that uses "hard law" to place legal responsibilities on MNCs for 
failing due diligence (vigilance) obligations.106 Much like French MNCs 
Id. 
ization or perhaps a prod to get America back among the vanguard for 
shaping an open rules-based order? 
101. Perhaps the ILO could work with China under its FTA with New Zealand. 
102. In this situation, a building collapsed and killed over 1,000 people work-
ing for foreign MNCs. See generally RANA PLAZA DONORS TRUST FUND, http://rana-
plaza-arrangement.org/fund [https://perma.cc/3WKH-59MU] (establishing a victim's 
fund through the efforts of the ILO and others); Ronald C. Brown, Fostering Labor 
Rights in a Global Economy: The Efficacy of the Emergent US Model Trade and Invest-
ment Frameworks to Advance International Labor Standards in Bangladesh, 155 INT'L 
LABOUR REV. 50 (2016); The Complaints Procedure, INT'L LABOUR ORG., http://www. 
ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/ 
complaints/WCMS_088451!lang--en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/2F3A-TBMV]. 
103. See Tzogopoulos, supra note 87. 
104. List of OECD Member Countries, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 
(2017), http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries. 
htm [https://perma.cc/HN4U-EWUL]. 
105. See Ronald C. Brown, Up and Down the Multinational Corporations' Global 
Labor Supply Chain: Making Remedies that Work in China, 34 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 
103 (2017). 
106. See audio tape: Due Diligence "Hard Law" Remedies for MNC Labor 
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having FDI in Cambodia and Vietnam, the utility of this law could be 
tested within RCEP countries and could cause the US. reenter the global 
trade market with labor protections in its FTAs. 
Though it seems unlikely with current rhetoric, the US. could in 
fact reconsider stepping away from global participation and reenter 
the TPP. Additionally, it could negotiate bilateral FTAs with individual 
countries in Asia that contain social dimension provisions with labor pro-
tection provisions. 
In the alternative, China could take a new approach. China might 
act under the pressure that its new global trade leadership responsibil-
ity comes with obligations, and it could urge inclusion of ILO core labor 
standards in the RCEP. It has already ratified many ILO Conventions and 
will fare no less well than the US., who has agreed to FTA labor provi-
sions without ratifying all the ILO core labor provisions.107 This approach 
would at least present a standard for RCEP countries and push domestic 
labor legislation to follow suit. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Will the TPP survive and provide a counter-posItIon for labor 
protection provisions in FTAs in Asia? Neither China nor the RCEP 
embrace these protections, and this paper suggests that the RCEP will 
further enhance the availability of under-regulated Asian labor for the 
benefit of MNC labor supply chains. Because US. withdrawal from the 
TPP has destabilized labor protection standards, China will likely impart 
its trade practices as it rises to leadership of global trade. Research sug-
gests that China's leadership of the RCEP will spur lower labor standards 
and fewer human rights protections within global supply chains, at least 
lower standards than those enforced under the TPP and US. leadership. 
It is important to recall that FTAs are only one of many possible methods 
of preventing lower labor standards. Other approaches are available and 
must continue to be examined. lOs 
Chain Workers, presentation by Ronald C. Brown at Labor Law Research Network 
Conference in Toronto, Can. (June 27, 2017) (on file with author); see also Brown, 
supra note 105 (discussing remedies being used in different countries, including joint 
liability, bonds, disclosures, etc.). 
107. See Ronald C. Brown, ASEAN: Harmonizing Labor Standards for Global 
Integration, 33 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 27 (2016). 
108. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 105; Brown, FTAs in Asia-Pacific, supra note 12. 
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ApPENDIX A: CHART 3 FTAs OF RCEP MEMBERS 
RCEP Nations HaveanFTA Does any of their other FTAs contain a Notes, Citations, Etc. 
with EU or US? labor provision? 
Brunei None ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)>>NO Brunei 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area trade agreement: 
(AANZFTA) »NO http://mofat.gov.bnJ 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) »NO PageslFree-Trade-
ASEAN-India Free Trade Agree- Agreements.aspx 
mentAIFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (AJCEP) »NO 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(AKFTA) »NO 
Brunei-Japan Economic Cooperation Partnership 
Agreement (BJEPA) »NO 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement (TPSEP/P4) »NO 
Cambodia None ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) »NO Cambodia Trade 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area Agreements: http:// 
(AANZFTA) »NO moe.gov.khlen-us/ 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) »NO trade-agreements 
ASEAN-India Free Trade Agree-
mentAIFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (AJCEP) »NO 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(AKFTA) »NO 
Indonesia None ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) »NO Indonesia Trade Agree-
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area ments: http://aric.abd. 
(AANZFTA) »NO org/fta-country 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-India Free Trade Agree-
mentAIFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (AJCEP) »NO 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(AKFTA) »NO 
Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Laos None ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) »NO Laos Trade Agree-
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area ment: http://aric.abd. 
(AANZFTA) »NO org/fta-country 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-India Free Trade Agree-
mentAIFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (AJCEP) »NO 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(AKFTA) »NO 
Laos-Thailand Preferential Trading Ar-
rangement »NO 
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RCEP Nations HaveanFTA Does any of their other FTAs contaio a Notes, Citations, Etc. 
with EU or US? labor provision? 
Malaysia None ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) »NO Malaysia Trade Agree-
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area ment: http://aric.adh. 
(AANZFTA) »NO org/fta-country 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-India Free Trade Agree-
mentAIFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (AICEP) »NO 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(AKFTA) »NO 
Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Malaysia Australia Free Trade Agreement »NO 
Malaysia-Chile Free Trade Agreement »NO 
Malaysia-India Comprehensive Economic Coop-
eration Agreement» NO 
Malaysia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Malaysia-Turkey Free Trade Agreement »NO 
Preferential Tariff Arrangement-Group of Eight 
Developing Countries »NO 
Singapore United States·Sioga. ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) »NO 
pore Free Trade ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area 
Agreement(USSFTA) (AANZFTA) »NO 
»YES» Chapter17 ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA)>>NO 
Singapore-EO Free ASEAN-India Free Trade Agree-
Trade Agreement mentAIFTA) »NO 
(Oct 2014 Agree- ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Part-
ment finalized but not nership (AICEP) »NO 
yet applied) ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(AKFTA) »NO 
European Free Trade Association-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement »NO 
Gulf Cooperation Council-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement (GSFTA) »NO 
India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation »NO 
Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a 
New-Age Partnership »NO 
New Zealand Singapore Economic 
Partnership »NO 
People's Republic of China-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
Singapore-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
Singapore-Costa Rica Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
Singapore-Panama Free Trade Agreement »NO 
Singapore-Peru Free Trade Agreement »NO 
Singapore-Taipei, China FTA »NO 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
[Republic of] Korea-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
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RCEP Nations HaveanFTA Does any of their other FTAs contain a Notes, Citations, Etc. 
with EU or US? labor provision? 
Thailand None ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) »NO Thailand Trade Agree-
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area ment: http://aric.adb. 
(AANZFTA) »NO org/fta-country 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-India Free Trade Agree-
mentAIFTA) »NO 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (AJCEP) »NO 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(AKFTA) »NO 
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Laos-Thailand Preferential Trade 
Agreement »NO 
People's Republic of China-Thailand Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement »NO 
Thailand-Chile Free Trade Agreement »NO 
Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partner-
ship Agreement »NO 
Thailand-Peru Free Trade Agreement» NO 
Vietnam Vietnam -E urope- ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) »NO EU-Vietnam: http:// 
an Union Free Trade ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area trade.ec.euro-
Agreement (Nego- (AANZFTA) »NO pa.eu/doclitpress/ 
tiations concluded: ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) »NO index.efm?id=1437 
2 Dec 2015, not put ASEAN-India Free Trade Agree- Vietnam Trade Agree-
into effect) mentAIFTA) »NO ments: http://aric.adb. 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Part- org/fta-country 
nership (AJCEP) »NO 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(AKFTA) »NO 
Chile Vietnam Free Trade Agreement »NO 
Japan-Vietnam Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Vietnam-Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
[Republic of] Korea-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
India None ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Coop- India Trade Agree-
eration Agreement» NO ments: http://aric.adb. 
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement »NO org/fta-country 
India-Afghanistan Preferential Trading 
Agreement »NO 
India-Bhutan Trade Agreement »NO 
India-Chile Preferential Trading 
Agreement »NO 
India-MERCOSURE Preferential Trade 
Agreement »NO 
India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation Agreement»NO 
India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement »NO 
India-Nepal Treaty ofTrade» NO 
Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship Agreement »NO 
Malaysia-India Comprehensive Economic Coop-
eration Agreement» NO 
South Asian Free Trade Area »NO 
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RCEP Nations HaveanFTA Does any of their other FTAs contaio a Notes, Citations, Etc. 
with EU or US? labor provision? 
Australia United States·Aus· ASEAN·Australia·New Zealand Free Trade Area US· Australia 
tralia Free Trade (AANZFTA)>>NO https:llustr.gov/sites/ 
Agreement> > Yes> > Australia·Chile Free Trade Agreement»NO default/liles/australia -
Article 18 (2004) Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Rela· FTA_Labor.pdf 
tions Trade Agreement»NO Australia 
Australia·[Republic of] Korea Free Trade Trade Agreements 
Agreement»NO https:llaric.adb. 
Japan·Australia Economic Partnership orglfta.couotry 
Agreement»NO 
Malaysia·Australia Free Trade Agreement»NO 
Papua New Gninea·Australia Trade and Com· 
mercial Region» N 0 
People's Republic of Chioa·Australia Free Trade 
Agreement»NO 
Siogapore·Australia Free Trade Agreement»NO 
South Pacific Regional trade and Economic Co· 
operation Agreement» NO 
Thailand·Australia Free Trade Agreement»NO 
Chioa None ASEAN· People's Republic of Chioa Comprehen. Chioa 
sive Economic Cooperation Agreement»NO Trade Agreements: 
Asia·Pacific Trade Agreement»NO https:llaric.adb. 
New Zealand· People's Republic of Chioa Free orglfta.couotry 
Trade Agreement» YES, per MOU 
People's Republic of Chioa·Australia Free Trade 
Agreement»NO 
People's Republic of Chioa·Chile Free Trade 
Agreement» YES, MINOR 
People's Republic of Chioa·Costa Rica Free 
Trade Agreement> > N 0 
People's Republic of Chioa·Hong Kong, 
Chioa Closer Economic Partnership Ar· 
rangement »NO 
People's Republic of Chioa·Iceland Free Trade 
Agreement» YES, MINOR 
People's Republic of Chioa·Macao Closer Eco· 
nomic Partnership Arrangement »NO 
People's Republic of Chioa· Pakistan Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
People's Republic of Chioa· Peru Free Trade 
Agreement» YES, MINOR 
People's Republic of Chioa·Siogapore Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
People's Republic of Chioa·Switzerland Free 
Trade Agreement» YES, MINOR 
People's Republic of Chioa· Taipei, Chioa 
Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement »NO 
People's Republic of Chioa· Thailand Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
People's Republic of Chioa·[Republic of] Korea 
Free Trade Agreement »NO 
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RCEP Nations HaveanFTA Does any of their other FTAs contaio a Notes, Citations, Etc. 
with EU or US? labor provision? 
Japan None ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Japan Trade Agree-
Partnership »NO ments: http://aric.adb. 
Japan-Australia Economic Partnership org/fta-country 
Agreement »NO Japan-Mongolia Eco-
Japan-Brunei Free Trade Agreement» NO nomic Partnership 
Japan-Chile Economic Partnership Agreement: http:// 
Agreement »NO www/mofa.go.jp/ 
Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partner- fies/OOOO67716.pdf 
ship Agreement »NO 
Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Japan·Mongolia Economic Partnership Agree. 
ment »YES »Article 10.17 
Japan-Peru Free Trade Agreement »NO 
Japan. Philippioes Economic Partnership Agree. 
ment »YES» Article 103 
Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a 
New-Age Partnership »NO 
Japan-Switzerland Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
Japan-Viet Nam Economic Partnership 
Agreement» NO 
South Korea [Republic of] ASEAN- [Republic of] Korea Comprehensive [Republic of Ko-
Korea·United Economic Cooperation Agreement »NO rea-United States 
States Free Trade Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement »NO Free Trade Agree-
Agreement Australia- [Republic of] Korea Free Trade ment: http://ustr.gov/ 
»YES »Art 19, Agreement »NO trade-agreements/ 
Annex 19·A (2007) India- [Republic ofj Korea Comprehensive Eco- free-trade-agreements/ 
[Republic of] Ko- nomic Partnership Agreement »No korus-fta/final-text 
rea -European New Zealand- [Republic ofj Korea Closer Eco- EU-South Korea: http:// 
Union Free Trade nomic Partnership »NO eur-Iex.europa.eu/ 
Agreement »NO People's Republic of China- [Republic of] Korea legpl-rontentienlAUJ?uri=O. 
Free Trade Agreement »NO J:L:2015:307:TOC 
[Republic of] Korea- Canada Free Trade Korea Free Trade 
Agreement »NO Agreements: http:// 
[Republic of] Korea- Chile Free Trade www.customs.go.kr/ke-
Agreement »NO shome/main/content! 
[Republic of] Korea- Colombia Free Trade ContentView.do?con-
Agreement »NO tentID=CONTENT_ 
[Republic of] Korea- European Free Trade Asso- ID_OOOO02349&lay-
ciation Free Trade Agreement »NO outMenuNo=23227 
[Republic of] Korea- Peru FTA »NO 
[Republic of] Korea- Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
[Republic of] Korea- Turkey Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
[Republic of] Korea- Viet Nam Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
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RCEP Nations HaveanFTA Does any of their other FTAs contaio a Notes, Citations, Etc. 
with EU or US? labor provision? 
New Zealand None ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free Trade New Zealand Trade 
Agreement »NO Agreement: http://aric. 
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Rela- adb.org/fta-country 
tions Trade Agreement »NO 
Malaysia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement »NO 
New Zealand -Hong Kong, China Closer Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreement »NO 
New Zealand-People's Republic of China Free 
Trade Agreement »NO 
New Zealand-Singapore Closer Economic 
Partnership »NO 
New Zealand-Taipei, China Economic Coopera-
tion Agreement »NO 
New Zealand- [Republic ofj Korea Closer Eco-
nomic Partnership »No 
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-
operation Agreement »NO 
Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partner-
ship Agreement »NO 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement »NO 
